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By Earl Cripe A Lincolnsonian View of Gettysburg and General Meade In Light of Late-Discovered Intelligence Documents. President Lincoln ambled into his office for a face-to-face meeting with Joe Hooker, Commanding General of the Army of the Potomac. "Joe, I have another report that Longstreet is over the Potomac and has taken the Boonsboro road to Hagerstown," the President said. Hooker was not convinced. "I do not believe that report, Mr. President, it does not line up with other things we know," he replied. "What are you going to do, then, Joe?" "I am going to wait until I have what I consider to be solid intelligence, Mr. President, unless you order me to move." Lincoln sighed wearily. "No, Joe, I am not going to do that. You do what you believe to be best." After 8:00 P.M. a telegram came from Babcock. It contained a report from a refugee student from St. James College in Hagerstown. [The students] report no force between Hagerstown and Frederick on Boonsboro road except one cavalry camp 4 miles from Hagerstown where they passed the pickets. No force at Boonsboro to be seen at South Mountain. From reliable sources they say they learned that Longstreet and A. P. Hill are coming rapidly. He took the matter up with Halleck at command. Together they divined that Hill and Longstreet were across the river and the force in front of Slocum was a feint. This was incorrect. The word went out to Hookers army to cross the river and start moving north, which they did with good smartness and speed. But they were doing so on false information. In truth, neither Hill nor Longstreet was yet across the river. Lee's feint at Slocum had backfired. He had meant to hold Hooker south of the river until later, but the action raised doubts and figured strongly in Hooker's decision to cross. This mistaken movement put Hooker and the Army of the Potomac in position in Pennsylvania ahead of Lee's main force. Ewell was already in Pennsylvania destroying and demoralizing. But Hooker's early movement thwarted the plan that Lee had in mind. To complicate matters for Lee, two other situations existed. Hooker's timely crossing of the Potomac, though based on bad intelligence, had the effect of stealing a march on Lee. Lee did not know that Hooker had moved and thought him still in Virginia. He did not find out his error until a crucial moment. And then, Jeb Stewart was off up north, widely interpreting (or misinterpreting) the liberty that Lee gave him. Stewart's foolish decision to ride around the Army of the Potomac again to regain some of his glory and reputation devastated Lee's plan. On June 27, Lee joined A. P. Hill at Chambersburg. When the conference broke up, Lee drew into the middle of the diamond and turned right onto the Gettysburg pike. The Union spy Hoke took a train to the capital and reported to General Couch. Couch telegraphed Hooker, who was muddling along in the rain to set up headquarters at Poolville, Maryland. General John Reynolds was at Middleton, the leading element of Howard's Eleventh Corps. He informed headquarters on the 28th of an apparent eminent attack on Gettysburg. Hooker had a division of cavalry sent in the direction of Emmitsburg and Gettysburg. He had known for certain since the twenty-seventh that Lee's entire invading army was in Pennsylvania. Even so, the Union had reason for optimism. Lee over extended his forces and spread them very thin. But the state of mind at army command was such that nothing brought joy or good feelings about any of this. Halleck and Lincoln were angry with Hooker. To them, he let Lee make his move into Pennsylvania with virtually no advance warning. They wanted him to stop Lee and do it now. Pandemonium, that bordered on panic, reigned at command headquarters. Halleck never favored Hooker's appointment and now he felt he could say so. The war of words that had been building since Chancellorsville now escalated to a crescendo. Hooker also said that Lincoln and Halleck were tying his hands. "Lee is free to maneuver and I am not," Hooker said bluntly to Halleck and the President. "This is an unequal fight. You people expect the impossible of me." Hooker was in a dilemma. He wanted out but he did not want to quit. He thought he knew a way to force Lincoln to replace him. "Mr. President," he said in a wire, "My force of 105,000 is significantly outnumbered by Lee. I must have more men." Hooker knew what McClellan and Pinkerton had done in constantly over-estimating the size of the enmy forces and how bitter it made Lincoln. He knew that these misrepesentations figured largely in Lincoln's decision to relieve McClellan as Commander of the Army of the Potomac for the final time. Hooker had very good intelligence that Lee had 85,000 at the very most. Halleck and Lincoln knew the same thing. Surely this would get him relieved. But Halleck and Lincoln could not see their way clear to do it. "Do the best you can with what you have," Lincoln wired back. Hooker wired Halleck. "If I fail in Pennsylvania, General Halleck is ready to make me the scapegoat. I will not stand for that. I am no longer able to comply with Halleck's orders and asked to be relieved from this position at once." Lincoln and Halleck held a short meeting. "I want Grant up here, Henry," the President said. Halleck jumped to his feet. "We can't pull him from Vicksburg. He is close to victory." "Sherman can take over. Anyone can wait out the siege. I need Grant." "If you bring up Grant, I will resign too!" Halleck shouted. I "have told you that I cannot and will not work with that mediocre, drunken fool. If you want to lose the war, Mr. President, why don't you just surrender?" Lincoln held his temper with considerable effort. He was in a fix. He did need Grant to stay at Vicksburg in spite of what he said. Now, Lee knocked on his door. He did not see how he could afford to lose Halleck and Hooker at the same time. "Who else is there?" Lincoln asked. Halleck thought fast. "Hooker has often said that George Meade is the ablest man in his command." "Meade? You will not work with Grant but you want Meade?" Lincoln bit his tongue. Halleck's petty jealousies were threatening the war effort. "All right, Henry, I will give you Meade, but I want this understood. If Meade fails, Grant is coming on and you are not going to resign. I will give you your way this time, but I get mine the next." Halleck did not want to agree, but he knew that if he pushed Lincoln too far, he would be out and Grant would be in immediately. Halleck did not want to be out. He liked it where he was. "Very well, Mr. President I agree that if Meade doesn't work out, Grant is in and I will hold my peace." Lincoln looked sternly at Halleck. "Don't forget it Henry," he said in a voice lacking its usual guarded humor. Within hours, Halleck and his staff headed for Frederick with orders making Meade the new commander of the Army of the Potomac. When Hooker heard about it, he berated himself for not negotiating. He had indeed said that of Meade in the past, but he would not have said it now. "We could have had John Reynolds," he told a friend sadly, "I never had an officer under me acquit himself so handsomely." Intelligence affirmed that Lee was pulling his forces together for something in the Gettysburg-Chambersburg vicinity. There followed a few days of trying to figure out the object of Lee's new plan. Meade believed Lee to be coming through four miles north of Chambersburg and about half way to Gettysburg. John Reynolds, sent to the area as an advanced guard of Howard's corps, did not think so but said little. When it finally became known that Lee was coming to Gettysburg, Meade began to shown signs of the same indecision and lack of offensive courage that had plagued all of the commanders of the Army of the Potomac before him. When Buford saw Meade's timidity, he turned to John Reynolds. "I remember exactly what you said to Meade at Chancellorsville when he was spouting off about Hooker being a coward Hooker and how brave he was." "Do you remember, General Buford? I don't." "Yea, John you said that none of us knows what he would do until he is in the position..." Reynolds held up his hand and stopped Buford in mid-sentence. "Sometimes the best quality a man can have is a good forgetter, Buford. I have forgotten and I strongly suggest that you forget, too. We have a war to win if we can." On the day of the beginning of the battle of Gettysburg, Meade sent to Halleck a telegram saying, "I shall not advance any, but prepare to receive an attack in case Lee makes one." Buford looked at the telegram and again questioned General Reynolds. "In case Lee makes one? He has his entire army, lacking only Pickett who is on the way as fast as he can move, amassed below Gettysburg. How can any General justify saying, 'In case he cares to attack?'" Reynolds was again the diplomat. "We must try to work together, General Buford, but from here on out until this battle is over, I don't think we are going to hear anything more from General Meade." Buford shook his head negatively. "A messenger is on the way now with another note from General Meade." For the first time, Reynolds showed some emotion. "I said, I am not going to hear anything more from General Meade until this battle is over, or until Meade is up in person. We have a war to win. We are not going to have another Chancellorsville." He looked hard at Buford who did not seem to get the message. Then he turned and rode back to get his troops, while Buford went on to Gettysburg to take charge of the men already there. The message the courier had was an announcement from Meade to his Army in a circulated paper, "[T]he object of the movement is prevention of the enemy's intended invasion of Philadelphia, &c. beyond Susquehanna. It is no longer [the] intention to assume the offensive until Lee's movements or position should render such an operation certain of success." A flaw in the order allowed any corps commander on his own initiative to withdraw his army back to Pipe Creek. It read: "Whenever such a circumstance arises as would seem to indicate the necessity for falling back and assuming this general line indicated, notice of such movement will be at once communicated to this headquarters and all adjoining corps commanders." It contained no requirement to ask for permission to withdraw. But Meade was spared this ignominy, through no grace of his own. Before he could let headquarters know what he had told his troops, the word came down. The battle of Gettysburg had begun. Fortunately for Meade and the Union, neither Reynolds nor Buford had paid any attention to Meade or his order. Until his death about the middle of the first day, John Reynolds got the Union into what he immediately saw were powerful positions. With the help of Buford, they were ready for the attack. Shortly after Reynolds' death, General Hancock came on the scene with orders from Meade to take charge of the battle, which he did with excellent judgment and action. The first day went well, with the Union holding and the Confederates making only small advances up the road. Hancock said of the Union position that it was the strongest he had seen in any battle. By dark, the entire Union Army arrived at Gettysburg with few minor exceptions, outnumbering Lee by as much as 30,000 troops. The Union guns were firmly entrenched on the high ground. Hancock was ecstatic. "Lee is attacking from no position of strength whatsoever except his large but smaller body of excellent fighting men. We are in the strongest possible defensive position. If the Army of the Potomac cannot win this battle," he said mockingly, "we could not win any battle at all." Hancock was right. The army was strongly entrenched. It was excellently led by Hancock in general control and Buford, Slocum, Warren, Newton, Gibbon, Birney, Sykes, Sedgewick, Howard and Williams, all fighting men. It was Warren who spoke. "We were deprived the right to fight and win in the Wilderness, as you yourself well remember, General Meade. But we will avenge ourselves here. I am looking forward to exorcising those ghosts right here and now." But Meade, who was there too and was one of the most vocally critical of Hooker for losing his nerve and snatching defeat from the jaws of victory, was now showing his timidity and lack of courage. "Yes, boys, this is a position out of which one can not easily be thrown but it can easily be turned." He turned to his chief lieutenant. "Hancock," he said with resolve, "I think we had best prepare for a retreat. I am not sure we can weather another day like the one just ended" Hancock looked at Meade as if he had lost his mind. "General Meade! The Union is in the same position tonight as we have been all day and our entire army is now up. What can you possibly mean when you say you are not sure we could weather another day like the one just ended?" Meade saw the anger, hostility and disappointment in the eyes of his generals. He decided on a momentary way out. "At 9:00 P.M. I would like to have you all gather in headquarters at the Lister house for a discussion." Sharp was sent for to supply what intelligence he had. The meeting opened with Mead trying to discourage his leaders. "Lee is being reinforced by Pickett right now tonight and tomorrow is sure to be much worse than today. With that in mind, and realizing that I truly believe it is in our best interests to pull back to Pipe Creek, I want to have discussion on this." Hancock had seen this happen once too often and he was not going to sit by again. He was quick to respond. "General, we have got them nicked." That was not what Meade wanted to hear. Sharp saw that Meade was intent on convincing his generals that they should pull back. "Pipe Creek is much more defensible. Don't you generals think we should pull back to a position closer to our supply base?" Hancock saw Meade's design and he remembered Chancellorsville and how Sykes and Sedgewick had voted with Hooker and later regretted it. He spun on the cot where he had been sitting with his back to the room and began to talk. "General Lee is many more miles from his supply base than we are from ours. General Meade, the Army of the Potomac knew they could win at the James but were denied the fight. The same thing happened at Malvern Hill. Just when Lee was about licked, McClellan pulled us out. In the Wilderness, the war was in our hands and General Hooker ordered us to quit. All those things happened far away in Lee's back yard and fear of consequences might more easily have been justified. Now we have Lee on our territory. His supplies are short, his men are tired from marching, and there is nothing between his rear and Richmond. If we run from this fight the cause of the Union is lost. I do not think the Army of the Potomac will ever recover its pride, its nerve, and its self-respect. We must stand and fight. Tomorrow's battle is what we are an army for." "Yes, General, but by falling back to Pipe Creek we will be in a more favorable defensive position." Warren spoke up. "General, no one in the room believes that. We are experienced military men with more than two years of fighting in these parts. None of us had ever seen a more favorable defensive position. Clearly, a more favorable defensive position does not exist than the fish-hook deployment directed by Reynolds, Buford, and Hancock on the high ground yesterday. If we pull out of this, we are cowards and our names will live in infamy." Meade looked about to try to get a feel for the position of the others. Finally, he ordered a formal vote by closed ballot. A formal vote was taken. Hancock, Warren, Slocum, Newton, Gibbon, Birney, Sykes, Sedgewick, Howard, and Williams were unanimously against any rearward movement of any kind. Mead was still not satisfied. He asked each general to enlarge upon his position. In that discussion, Hancock, Warren, Slocum, Newton, Gibbon, Birney, Sykes, Sedgewick, Howard and Williams were for standing and fighting. Three generals favored some adjustments in the lines but none were for any rearward movement that would give up even a foot of ground. As they left the Lister house, Sharp walked along side General Hancock. "Thank you, General, for saving the Union." Hancock was embarrassed and nodded politely. But Sharp truly believed that Hancock's pep talk had saved the battle of Gettysburg. Like the others, he believed that if the Union had run from Gettysburg, they could not win the War. It was clear to Sharp that Meade was both disappointed and disturbed but asked the question, "should we attack or wait to be attacked?" The question again displayed a lack of orderly thinking on Meade's part. Birney was the one to respond. "Why would anyone even consider giving up such a defensive position to meet Lee out in the open when Lee, who is already in the open, is clearly planning to attack?" The opinion was unanimous that they should defend and not attack. Meade had a third question: "How long they shall we wait to be attacked. I favor leaving after a day. If Lee does not attack tomorrow, he has changed his plans and is up to something. I not want Lee to steal a march with half his army and get behind us and between us and Washington." This was not a conclusive vote, though most of the generals were not in favor of waiting more than a day if Lee did not attack. It turned out to be a purely academic discussion. On The Other Side "Damn it, Lee, this fight is insane," said a very animated and worried James Longstreet. "Why are we doing this. We have exactly what we want. Let's go around Meade's left, continue on toward Washington, and make Meade attack us." Lee was patient but unyielding. "James, I know your penchant for fighting only defensive battles when attacked. And, yes, it is easier to defend a position than to overrun one, particularly the one we face on the morrow." "General, the one we face tomorrow cannot be overrun, by us or anyone else. It is a bastion. The Army of Northern Virginia has never been beaten in a defensive battle. I know Meade's timidity and he will not attack us. He will march parallel, feint and bluster but nothing more. He will spend all his time trying to make us attack him. I know him well from my days in the Union. He is a good, careful, thorough but very limited general. A 'Fighting Joe Hooker' he is not. A great gift has been handed to us. For God's sake, General Lee, don't hand it back." Lee held up his hand for an end to it. "Jim, I have listened to you out of courtesy and out of a policy of always listening to my generals the night before a campaign. But if we go any further with this it is going to work against us. My army is invincible. Tomorrow's task is daunting, but the Union cannot stand before the Army of Northern Virginia. When we throw our strength at them, they will break. We must not let them think we are afraid of them. This battle will mean the end of the war. These are the great battles where great wars are won. I do not want to sneak into Washington; I want to march in as the proud conqueror." Perhaps spur-of-the-moment decisions, made on-the-fly, had been worse. But once time had been allowed for deliberation and counsel, a poorer decision--a more colossal military blunder of major proportions in a major conflict--does not exist in the history of wars than Lee made at Gettysburg in marching into the middle of Meade's army, wave after wave, only trying Meade's right (the only possible avenue of success) long after the outcome was determined. It was worse than suicide--it was masochism. To add to the ignominy, he had been warned and pleaded with, by the man he himself called the best thinker among his generals, not to do it. The three days fighting at Gettysburg complete broke the Army of Northern Virginia. Many of its leaders and one third of the fighting men lost their lives. Worse still, Lee, who strangely believed his army to be invincible, was broken and discouraged. Against all sound military judgment he kept at it because he was sure, on metaphysical grounds, that somehow he was going to win against all odds. Only after the fighting stopped, did he realize what he had done. Lee pleaded with his generals to give him help in getting the remaining army out of Gettysburg and into some kind of orderly retreat as soon as possible. Lee fully expected that he would be destroyed by Meade. So did Meade's army. "I will give you half an hour to show your self a great general," said the feisty Pleasanton to Meade. "Order the army to advance and I will take the cavalry and get in Lee's rear and we will finish this campaign within a week." But Meade was not listening. He was not going after Lee. "A wounded bear is known to be the most dangerous," he said weakly. "Lee is still in good condition and able to make a fight. My army is too beaten up to fight any more just now." Pleasanton dropped any pretense of understanding and stared angrily at Meade as he shook his head in disbelief. But Meade did not respond as Pleasanton hoped. "I know the itch my men feel to go after Lee and I am sorry for your contempt; but I am content with what we have accomplished. It is more than I expected or hoped for. I will report this great victory to Lincoln and Halleck. They cannot fail to be elated." In his letter to Lincoln, he added: "I rejoice in that the enemy had been driven from our soils..." It was another mistaken judgment on Meade's part. Lincoln expressed anything but elation with Meade's report, bitterly criticizing him. "General Meade, I wanted you to go after Lee. Why did you not do so? There seems to be no acceptable reason." An angry Lincoln asked his private secretary John Hay, "When will our generals get that idea out of their heads? The whole country is 'our soil'." Halleck logged on to Lincoln's disappointment and disapproval. "The President's thought and wish for you, General Meade, is not to win great and glorious battles but to win the war. That could have and should have been done by destroying the Army of Lee. It was handed to you and you sat in indecision and lack of courage, ignoring the pleas of your own generals, and let Lee limp away. Perhaps you did not know the condition of Lee's army or the exact condition of your own, but good Commanding Generals are not timid and they seize the moment. Most commanding officers will never see the kind of chance for dramatic victory that lay before you. A great opportunity was lost and the disappointment of the President is not abated at this time." Meade, seeing that Lincoln was not going to let up on the pressure or the criticism, went after Lee but found him already across the river. Meade was relieved and reported the matter to Halleck and the President. "I have, in keeping with your wishes, pursued the Army of Northern Virginia with tenacity and dispatch. But he is across the river and beyond my reach at this time. I simply will not put my beleaguered army across the river at this time." It was more than Lincoln could endure. The very thing he feared had happened. He instructed Halleck to impart to Meade his displeasure, which Halleck did. Meade saw the same syndrome developing with him as with other commanders. Nothing he did was going to please Lincoln who thought his commanders should always act promptly and correctly as he understood it from his office chair. Meade fired off a testy letter: "Mr. President, I am hurt by the lack of appreciation and support. If you and the Chief of Staff are not satisfied with my performance, you have my offer to resign." Halleck convinced Lincoln that they had no one else at the time and had to keep Meade or the army would be without a commander. "Other generals do not think Meade has been treated right by you, Sir. They see Gettysburg as a great victory but no thanks has come to Meade. They did not see the situation as you and I know and see it. Demoralization is a real danger." Lincoln waved him to silence. He was in no mood to talk about it. He did not need to be without Meade, Hooker, and Halleck and with no other general anxious to take over. Inside, Lincoln was very unhappy and frustrated. He thought carefully and tried to resist the temptation, but lost the battle. "Grant would have won the battle and destroyed Lee. In criticizing Meade, I have to ponder my own lack of courage. I let you force me to retreat. Two great and rare opportunities to end the war have gone by the boards because I bowed to your fear of embarrassment if Grant came in. And the reason was one-fold. When you were in the field together, Grant was not afraid to fight, and you, like all my other generals, were." Halleck was stunned and felt his body aching with tension and...and fear. He suddenly understood that he did not know Lincoln as well as he thought he did. Finally, he rose, without comment, and went to send his message of conciliation to Meade. The Analysis Thus, a strange epilog to Gettysburg can be written. 1. Hooker used military intelligence brilliantly at Chancellorsville but lost the battle because of mistakes in the field. 2. When Lee invaded Pennsylvania, Hooker outflanked Lee and put the Army of the Potomac in a position to win the battle of Gettysburg because of poor intelligence. 3. Lee, who was far from home and with no supply lines, should not have attacked the strength of the Union's middle and the formidable positions of the high ground at Gettysburg. Had he not done so, and had he listened to Longstreet, he in all likelihood would have won the war on the Pennsylvania campaign. 4. Meade lost his nerve and tried to withdraw from the battle of Gettysburg but it started too soon. 5. Because of the wisdom of Howard, the brilliant work of Hancock, Reynolds and Buford, and the resoluteness of his generals, Meade was credited with a great victory that he was trying to run from but could not. 6. The thing for which Lincoln had fought and prayed for more than two years was limping across the landscape in front of him asking to be had. The destruction of Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia was as certain as the morning sun if Meade had simply said "all right" to Pleasanton. Meade had the men, the horses, the guns, the food, and the numbers. He simply lacked the courage. The Lincoln-Meade Relationship In the months that followed Meade did much to reverse the notion that he lacked courage but not much to dispel the notion the he would always back up and fight a counter-punching, ground-giving strategy. "Mr. President," he said laboriously on day as they sat on camp chairs overlooking the Rappahannock, "My strategy is to fight defensive battles. It is safer, and it makes the enemy work harder. This did not suit Lincoln at all who accused Meade to his face. "General, I must tell you that you fight like an old woman shooing geese across a road with a broom." Meade was offended. He got up and wandered off across the green grass toward the bank of the river. Then he came back to Lincoln who was sitting stretched out in the undersized chair as if he never intended to move again. "Well, then, Mr. President, it seems clear that you should replace me as soon as possible." Lincoln did not back off. "I will replace you, General, when the time is right and when I have the right personnel to do it. Or, I may not replace you. I may change the command structure." Meade was bewildered by the President's comments. "What does that mean, Mr. President?" Lincoln's oddities and his completely unreadable face were admirably suited for this kind of discussion. "I am not sure, General. We shall perhaps learn together when it happens." A confused Meade watched the President amble slowly toward his boat to return to Washington. As he did, he muttered to himself. "Sometimes Lincoln acts and talks as strangely as he looks." © Earl Cripe, July, 2001 Earl Cripe, Phd Article Source: [http://EzineArticles.com/?Lincoln,-Meade,-and-Gettysburg&id=1897817] Lincoln, Meade, and Gettysburg |
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